CHAPTER XI.

KRISHNARĀJA WODEYAR II, 1734-1766—(*contd.*).

Haidar lays siege to Mysore, *c.* August-December 1759 : Fall of Nanjarajaiya —The end of the *Dalavai Regime—Seventh Phase*: 1759-1761 : Haidar's aggrandisement, 1759-1760 —His southern movements, May-June 1760—Returns to Mysore and makes truce with the Mahrattas, July 1760—First attempt of Khande Rao to put down his rising power, July-August 1760—Haidar's flight to Bangalore, August 1760—Krishnaraja signs peace with the Mahrattas, August 1760—Khande Rao plans Haidar's capture, and seeks Mahratta aid, August-September 1760—Haidar blockaded by the Mahrattas in Bangalore, September-November 1760 ; His peace with them, November 1760—Renews his southern movements, December 1760—Khande Rao opposes him, December 1760—Haidar and Nanjarajaiya *vs.* Khande Rao : December 1760—January-March 1761—Haidar strengthens himself, March-May 1761—And invests Seringapatam, June 1761 ; His ultimatum—The Royalist movement, 1760-1761 : Their alliance with the Mahrattas (down to November 1760) ; And their negotiations with the English Government at Madras, September-October 1760—The negotiations continued, October-December 1760—December 1760-June 1761—The English attitude on the Mysore question, 1760-1761—The position of the Mahrattas in the Karnatak (down to June 1761)—The climax, June 20, 1761 ; Haidar's usurpation complete, July 1761—*Eighth Phase* : 1761-1766 : The usurpation and after.

Haidar lays siege to Mysore, *c.* August-December 1759.

IN DECEMBER 1759 Haidar succeeded in reducing the fort of Mysore after an investment ranging our a period of three or four months.[1] At the desire of the *Kartar*, he next curtailed the three lakhs' *jahgīr* granted

1. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 19. See also and compare *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 269, received January 23, 1760—supplement of letter to Bābā Sāheb. According to this source, " there are disturbances rife even in

to Nanjarājaiya (Haidar's erstwhile master) to one of five places (namely, Kaṭṭe-Maḷalavāḍi, Piriyāpaṭṇa, Koṇanūr, Beṭṭadapura and Arkalgūḍ) yielding only a lakh of *varahas*; sent Nanjarājaiya to Koṇanūr; and returned to Seringapatam after placing guards over the Mysore fort.[2]

Fall of Nanjarājaiya.

Thus came to an end the Daḷavāi régime in Mysore (1734-1759). Nanjarājaiya, accompanied by Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao (who had remained with him in Mysore since June 1759), quietly proceeded to Koṇanūr, where he settled himself with his family and spent the rest of his life.[3]

The end of the *Daḷavāi Régime*.

With the retirement of Nanjarājaiya from the public life of Mysore, the predominance of Haidar over the counsels of State was fully ensured, for he rose as much in the favour and approbation of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar (the *Kartar*) as Nanjarājaiya went down. Haidar's military position too, at the end of 1759, was secure. He had become so powerful that, as a contemporary letter puts it,[4] "no body can hope to score any point against him." His strength was concentrated in Diṇḍigal; he had

Seventh Phase: 1759-1761.

Haidar's aggrandisement, 1759-1760.

Shrirangapattan, as there are differences growing between Haidar Khan and Nandiraja. Haidar Khan has collected his army at Shrirangapattan and has besieged that fort." The reference to the siege of Seringapatam in this passage is incorrect. In the light of the context and the *Haid. Nām.*, the allusion is obviously to the siege of Mysore, which is inaccurately reported. The letter appears to have been written in or about December 1760 when the siege was in progress.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid*, ff. 20. According to the Ms., Barakki Venkaṭa Rao and his two sons Śrīnivāsa Rao and Chandra Rao had stayed with Nanjarājaiya in Mysore. Nanjarājaiya, however, while leaving for Koṇanūr, sent back Venkaṭa Rao and Chandra Rao to Seringapatam, taking with him Śrīnivāsa Rao only.

4. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XL, *Letter* No. 116, cited in Ch. X, f.n. 111. Though this letter is dated January 19, 1759, it is a sufficient index of Haidar's military position throughout the year. See also text of *Mily Cons.*, quoted in f.n. 8 *infra*.

taken possession of Pālilore, Vāṇiyambāḍi and Krishṇagiri; and was undisputed master of a territory below the ghāṭs, "worth 5 lakhs of undisturbed revenue."[5] Early in 1760 Haidar again, we learn,[6] represented to the *Kartar* about more countries being assigned to him in view of his having, as he alleged, lately incurred enormous expenses, particularly during the siege of Mysore. In vain did Khaṇḍē Rāo protest against the demand being acceded to. The *Kartar*, however, made over to Haidar the four, out of ten, taluks (namely, Śādamangala, Paramaṭṭi, Anantagiri and Nāmakal) formerly granted to Nanjarājaiya. And this brought in its train a misunderstanding between Khaṇḍē Rao and Haidar.

His southern movements, May-June 1760.

In May-June 1760 Haidar was in the south, actively assisting the French against the English. These two nations were now at war in India (The *Seven Years' War*, 1756-1763), on the renewed prétext of espousing the cause of Razā Sāhib (Nawāb Zia-ud-daula Alī Razā Khān Chuckmak-Jang Bahadur, second son of Chandā Sāhib) and Muhammad Alī Wālājāh, respectively, to the succession to the Nawābship of the "Carnatic."[7] In June, M. Lally, by way of retrieving his position after the

5. *Ibid.* *Pālilore* may be identified with Polilore, in the present Chingleput District, Madras Presidency. More correctly, *Puḷḷalūr*, palmyra village; about 9 miles north of Conjeeveram. Remarkable later as the scene of the most grievous disaster which befell the British army in India in the 18th century. As will be narrated below, on 10th September 1780, Col. Baillie, who was marching from Madras to effect a junction with Sir Hector Munro at Conjeeveram, was here totally routed and his whole force either cut to pieces or captured by the united forces of Haidar and Tipū. The palmyra trees here still bear evidence of the fierceness of the cannonade. Another battle took place here, on the same ground, between Sir Eyre Coote and Haidar in the following year, in which the former was so far victorious that he occupied the post taken up by Haidar. Haidar, however, always claimed it as a drawn battle. The importance attached to the place by Haidar will be perceived from the fact that he had his eye on it in 1759-1760.

Haid. Nām., l.c.

For the general course of the history of South India during 1755-1761, see *Wilks*, I. 419-464; *O.H.P.*, V. 138-140, 157-165; *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 18-19, etc.

battle of Wandiwash (January 22, 1760), sought Haidar's help and concluded with him through Noronha, Bishop of Halicarnassus, a treaty, by which Haidar was, among other things, promised Tyāga-durg (the "Tagada" of the *Fort St. George Records*) and other places (namely, Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, Elavāsanūr, Śankarapuram and Valikoṇḍapuram) as *jahgīr*, French assistance to capture Madura and Tinnevelly countries as soon as the English had been defeated, and rupees two lakhs a month for the pay of his troops.[8] Haidar, in pursuance of this treaty,

8. *Di. A. Pi.*, XII.-162, 187-188: *Notes* dated June 17, 29, 1760 (see also Dodwell's *Editorial Introduction*, pp. XIII-XIV). According to this source, Haidar had encamped at Tyāga-durg already by June 17, 1760, when the treaty was concluded. See also and compare *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 624-626: *Consultation* dated July 3, 1760. This treaty is further significant from the point of view of the continuation by Haidar of Nanjarājaiya's scheme of southern expansion of Mysore. It seems, however, to have been Haidar's ulterior motive to make the treaty serve his own personal ends also, for an advice speaks of him as having "assumed the reins of government in the Mysore kingdom, where the Rajah has many powerful relations," whence "it was no small inducement to Hyder Naik to assist the French, when they promised to support him, with their whole force, against all his opponents, as soon as their fleet arrived" (*Mily. Cons.*, 642-645: *Letter* dated June 26, 1760—Captain Richard Smith, Trichinopoly, to George Pigot and Council, Fort St. George).

Tyāga-durg: 8 miles east of Kallakurchi, South Arcot District, about 750 ft. in height; once strongly fortified; like Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, it formed one of the bulwarks against invasion from above the *ghāṭs*. After capturing Tiruvaṇṇāmalai, the French, in October 1757, attacked it but were repulsed. They took it, however, in 1759, at the direction of the French General M. Lally. The place was defended by Serjeant-Major Hunterman and Lieutenant Raillard, a Swiss in the employ of the English. A thrilling account of the fight that ensued between the English and the French is given by Orme (*Indostan*, II. 500-501). Raillard, after a gallant fight, killed himself to avoid the disgrace of defeat, while Hunterman and Krishṇa Rao, a Brahman officer who greatly distinguished himself in the defence of the place, obtained honourable terms and surrendered the place. As mentioned in the text above, it was made over to Haidar Alī in 1760, in return for help to be given to the French, who were then being besieged in Pondicherry. When Haidar withdrew his forces from it owing to trouble at home, the French reoccupied it in September 1760. The British recaptured it in 1761, Major Preston bombarding and blockading the Pettah for 65 days. Haidar took it in 1781 but on his retirement it was retaken by the English. In 1790, Tipū made an unsuccessful attempt on it but was beat off by Captain Flint, the defender of Wandiwash. It is now an

despatched a detachment of 3,000 horse and foot with artillery to Pondicherry, under Saiyid Mokhdum and Barakki Venkaṭa Rao.[9]

Returns to Mysore and makes truce with the Mahrattas, July 1760.

In July, Haidar returned to Mysore which was being invaded by the Mahrattas under Visāji Krishṇa (the "Wazazey Punt"—Visāji-Pant—of the *Fort St. George Records*) on account of the alleged arrears of contributions for 1758 and 1759, due to the Pēshwa.[10] Haidar was "desirous of accommodating matters by paying the chout [chauth]."[11] The Mahrattas, however, demanded 40 lakhs; Haidar offered only 15. Whereupon a truce was agreed upon for eight days and it was expected, before the expiry of the period,

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important trade centre, being at the intersection of the old road from Arcot to Trichinopoly with the road from Salem to Cuddalore.

Why Haidar wanted to secure it will be evident from its position, commanding as it does the Attūr Pass from Salem. This accounts for the severe fighting that took place in connection with it during the 18th century.

A recent visit to this place shows that the space on the top of the hill is rather small and cramped. It actually consists of two knolls, joined by a somewhat lower saddle, the more western of which is slightly the higher. The plan in Orme's *Indostan* shows that the village at the foot of the hill was also fortified in his time. Tradition says the upper foot was built by one Lālsingh, who, with his wife, is said to lie buried in the two tombs which are to be still seen beside a tank, north of the road to Kallakurchi. A well to the south of the road to Cuddalore is also attributed to Lālsingh. On the western knoll of the hill are the ruins of a battery attributed to the French. Below these is an old cannon marked with Royal Crown and the monogram "G.R.," which probably stands for "George Rex," having been cast during the reign of King George III (1760-1820). A similar cannon is found on the eastern part of the fort. These two cannons must form part of the three sent by the English with the detachment from Trichinopoly to reinforce the garrison under command of Lieutenant Raillard, above mentioned. The third cannon must be buried somewhere near about. (See, for further information, W. Francis, *South Arcot District Gazetteer*, 340-343.)

9. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 19; cf. *Mily. Cons.*, 624-626 *supra*.
10. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. pp. 229-230, 230-231, *Letter* Nos. 262 and 263, dated July 15, 16, 1760—Pigot to Visāji-Pant, and Pigot to Pēshwa Bālāji Rao. See also *Sel. Posh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 266 cited *infra*.
11. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 719-720: *Letter* dated August 3, 1760—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council.

"such terms will be made as to prevent further hostilities." [12]

First attempt of Khaṇḍē Rao to put down his rising power, July-August 1760.

In the meantime, there was growing opposition to Haidar in the court of Seringapatam, where Khaṇḍē Rao, in collaboration with Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya, Narasimha Dās, Lālā Dās, Vīraṇṇa Seṭṭi of Koḷḷēgāl and Aṇṇaiya Śāstri, had been actively bringing home to Krishṇarāja and the dowager queen (Doḍḍamma) the supreme position attained by Haidar and the probable consequences it might lead to.[13] This apart, Haidar had also incurred the displeasure of the Rāja by acting against the latter's wishes in assisting the French.[14] Taking advantage, therefore, of the truce between Haidar and the Mahrattas, Khaṇḍē Rao and his colleagues managed to win over Visāji Kriṣhṇa through Bhukānji Hari Dut, the Mahratta banker now in Seringapatam,[15] agreeing "to pay the [Pēshwa's] tribute in conformity with the contract with Gopalraoji last year [1758-1759]," on condition of Mahratta assistance being

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 20; see also text of *Mily. Cons.*, quoted in f.n. 8 *supra.*

14. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 321: *Letter* No. 380, received October 3, 1760—King of Mysore to Capt. Smith; also pp. 328-330: *Letter* No. 387, received October 7, 1760—Khaṇḍē Rao to Pigot.

15. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; also *Mily. Cons.*, 777-778: *Letter* dated September 3 1760—John Andrews to Pigot and Council. According to the latter source, Visāji-Pant is stated to have explained in a letter of his to the Nawāb (Muhammad Alī), "That the King [of Mysore] wrote him if he would return thither and expel Hyder Naigue his dominions, he would give him 40 lack [lakhs] of Rupees, 5 forts and the possession of half his country, upon which he marched near Syringapatam, the capital . . ." See also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 291: *Letter* No. 350, received September 9, 1760—Visāji-Pant to Pigot, wherein Visāji speaks of "the Mayasore Vakeels having come to me jointly with Bukensey Harydet, soucar, negotiated and finished the affairs of Kandamy alias chout and for straw and grain agreeable to the directions of the king there but Hyder Naick, who was formerly a common peon and has raised himself lately to the highest posts, through his wicked pride and want of consideration, began to delay or interrupt the affairs of Balazeraw's [Bālāji Rao's] circar," etc.

guaranteed for putting down Haidar.[16] At this juncture, "Haidar," as Visāji tells us,[17] "intervened and decreed non-payment of the fixed tribute, and proposed to support his proposal by means of what he considered to be a well-equipped army, lodged in the Shukravarpeth of Pattan [Seringapatam]." Almost simultaneously the negotiations with the Mahrattas were supplemented by a selected force of four thousand under the command of Khaṇḍē Rao, "with instructions to bide their own time for sure victory."[18] At length, early on the morning of August 24, Khaṇḍē Rao, having secured the eastern gate of Seringapatam, opened fire on the camp of Haidar from above the fort walls, while some of his forces, passing through the Bridge Gate (*sētuve bāgilu*), surprised Haidar's contingent near Karīghaṭṭa, killing M. Mainville (French Commander now in Haidar's service).[19]

Haidar's flight to Bangalore, August 1760.

At the same time, the Mahrattas too appeared on the scene.[20] Haidar saw the reality of the situation he was in, and, scenting danger to his very life, prepared to take to flight.[21] It was rainy season; the Cauvery was in full floods; Khaṇḍē Rao had removed all the basket boats (*haragōlu*) into the fort and there was no conveyance by which to cross the river, save an old hollow

16. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 266, dated September 11, 1760—Visāji Krishṇa to Balkōba Tātya.
17. *Ibid*; see also and compare *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 350 *supra*.
18. *Ibid*; cf. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 380 and 387 *supra*.
19. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 20. [Here, for the scribal slip *Pramāthi*, *Śrāvaṇa śu.* 13, read *Vikrama*, *Śrāvaṇa śu.* 13 (August 24, 1760, Sunday), the correct date of the event. There was an intercalary *Śrāvaṇa* in *Vikrama* (see *Ind. Eph.*, VI. 323), and the event is assigned to *Nija-Śrāvaṇa* with reference to the context, as above.] See also and compare *Mily. Count. Corres.* and *Mily. Cons.*, cited in f.n. 14 and 15 *supra*.
20. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, l.c.
21. *Ibid*; also *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. Cf. *Mily. Cons.*, 816-823: *Letter* dated September 6, 1760, cited *infra*. Cf. also advice in *Mily. Cons.* (830-831: *Letter* dated September 15, 1760—Pigot and Council to the President and Council, Fort William), which speaks of Haidar's flight thus: "Hyder Naig, late Duan to the King of Mysoor, has proved a rebel and been driven from the heart of his dominions by the assistance of the Morattas."

bamboo structure (*bidaru ṭokare*).[22] Haidar, says the chronicle,[23] soon got it shaped into a boat by securely tying it with water-skins (*pakāli*) from his army. At dusk he forded the river, with as much treasure as could be conveyed, twenty horses and a select retinue, leaving behind his wife and his eight-year old son Tipū. At Hārohaḷḷi, on his way, Venkaṭapataiya, the local Amildār, furnished him with the revenue collections (*irasālu*) of the place and, about the end of August, Haidar reached Bangalore.[24] Having, with the help of Kabīr Beig, consolidated his position as far as Ānekal and raised substantial loans from the merchants of Bangalore,[25] Haidar recalled Saiyid Mokhdum with his troops from Pondicherry as well as his force from Krishṇagiri in the Pāyanghāṭ.[26] Haidar's position about this time was sought to be further secured by the appointment in his service of a talented soldier in the person of Mīr Fuzzul-Ullāh Khān (from Kōlār), son-in-law of Dilāvar Khān, Nawāb of Sīra, on a monthly salary and a proffered assignment of one lakh country as his *jahgīr*.[27]

Krishṇarāja signs peace with the Mahrattas, August 1760.

Meanwhile at Seringapatam Khaṇḍē Rao, on the morrow of Haidar's flight, kept the latter's family in honourable confinement;[28] and Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar signed a treaty of peace with the Mahrattas, granting them biennial *chauth* for 1758 and 1759 as agreed with Gōpāl Rao, in addition to three

22. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

23. *Ibid*, ff. 20-21. [Haidar's retinue during his flight, according to the Ms., consisted of Ibrāhim Sāhib and Husain Sāhib (his maternal uncle and nephew), Diṇḍigal Venkaṭappa, Venkaṭa Rao of Uttamapāḷyam (26 miles S.W. of Periyakuḷam, Diṇḍigal Sub-Division, Madura District), Śrīnivāsa Jīvāji of the *Tōshīkhāne*, and Mīr Alī Razā Khān.] See also and compare *Mily. Count. Corres.* and *Mily. Cons.*, cited in f.n. 14 and 15 *supra*.

24. *Ibid*, ff. 21. 25. *Ibid*.

26. *Ibid*; also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 350 *supra*.

27. *Ibid*, ff. 21-22.

28. *Ibid*, ff. 21; also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, l.c.

lakhs by way of *Ghāsdana*, and returning the stations newly taken from them (during 1760).[29] Visāji Krishṇa retired to Hoskōṭe, leaving his main army near Seringapatam to collect the dues and secure the release of the military strongholds under the treaty.[30] For it was his programme "to attend to the many questions pending below the ghats," by way of realising the Pēshwa's ambition.[31]

Khaṇḍē Rao plans Haidar's capture, and seeks Mahratta aid, August-September 1760.

Almost simultaneously Khaṇḍē Rao had letters—in his own name and that of the king—circulated all over the country, proclaiming that Haidar Naik, having turned out a traitor, had fled, and offering adequate rewards to those who would capture his person and send him to Seringapatam.[32] His plan, however, proved ineffective. On receipt of news of Haidar having reached Bangalore, Khaṇḍē Rao, on behalf of Krishṇarāja, not only wrote to Visāji to obstruct the passage of Mokhdum's detachment from Pondicherry,[33] but also despatched 4,000 horse, 6,000 sepoys, 500 soldiers and 40 guns with necessary ammunition, to lead an attack on Bangalore jointly with the Mahrattas.[34] During September, the Mahrattas were planning Haidar's pursuit to Bangalore,[35] and Visāji Krishṇa, in expectation of assistance from Mysore, "resolved to send a proper

29. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 266 *supra*; also *Letter* No. 276, dated September 1760 (?)—Visāji Krishṇa to Lakshmanpanta Aṇṇa; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, l.c., and p. 328: *Letter* No. 386, received October 7, 1760—Visāji-Pant to Pigot; see also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 22. *Ghāsdana*: customary halting allowance for straw and grain. See also quotation from *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 350, in f.n. 15 *supra*. S. G. Vaze, B.A., in his *Marathi-English Dictionary* (1928), gives under *Ghāsdāṇa* the following:—"A levy of grass and grain. A military contribution" (p. 164).

30. *Ibid*, *Letter* Nos. 266 and 276 *supra*. 31. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 266 *supra*.

32. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 21. 33. *Ibid.*

34. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX. pp. 11-12: *Letter* No. 14, received January 26, 1761—King of Mysore to Pigot.

35. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, *Letter* No. 266 *supra*; also *Mily. Cons.*, 823-824: *Letter* dated September 10, 1760—John Andrews to Pigot and Council.

force to give him a finishing stroke."[36] Indeed to the Mahrattas the crushing of Haidar seemed absolutely necessary in their projected expansion southwards (up to Rāmēśvaram), and they had been viewing with concern his rising military talents and power, particularly since 1758.[37] Haidar's position, however, about the middle of September 1760, is perhaps best reflected in a letter of Visāji Krishṇa, wherein he says,[38] "Haidar maintains an unconvincing pomp. Though he has a well-equipped contingent, [his boasts are perfectly valueless]. He had sent his forces to aid the French at Pondicherry. Half of them were destroyed by the English. The Raja of Pattan [Seringapatam] has joined hands with us and consequently he can achieve nothing on this side. Otherwise it is not in the nature of Haidar to be quiet. . . ."

Haidar blockaded by the Mahrattas in Bangalore, September-November 1760.

Towards the close of September, Saiyid Mokhdum (from Pondicherry), passing through Gingee and Tyāga-durg, arrived with his detachment at Anchutty-durg in the Bārāmahal, and found himself encircled and opposed by Ānanda Gōpāl, the Mahratta sardār, sent thither by Visāji Krishṇa.[39] Haidar despatched a portion of his forces under Fuzzul-Ullāh Khān and Kabīr Beig to Mokhdum's relief, and it was not till about the middle of October that the latter, with Barakki Venkaṭa Rao, succeeded in making his way to join Haidar.[40] Meantime the forces from Mysore sent by

36. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII, *Letter* No. 350 *supra.*
37. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XL, *Letter* Nos. 104 and 116; and Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* Nos. 228, 229, 242,245, 275, etc., cited in Ch. X and *supra.*
38. *Ibid*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 276 *supra.*
39. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 22; see also *Mily. Cons.*, 811-812, 826, 830-831, 848, 868 and 880: *Letters* dated September 14 to 29, 1760; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. pp. 316-317: *Letter* No. 374, dated September 28, 1760—Pigot to Nawāb. According to *Mily. Cons.*, 812 (dated September 14, 1760), Haidar's detachment was "of very little assistance to the French." The disturbances caused by his troops below the ghāṭs are frequently noticed in the *Cons.* for June-September 1760.
40. *Ibid.*

Khaṇḍē Rao, in co-operation with the ten thousand horse of Pēshwa Bālāji Rao commanded by Visāji Krishṇa, had invested Bangalore.[41] Mokhdum stationed his troops near Nelamangala,[42] where he was again surrounded by 1,000 Mysore horse, 2,000 sepoys and Mahrattas with 4 guns.[43] For nearly two months, Bangalore was under a blockade and Haidar reduced to great extremities. At last, about the end of November, he was obliged to make peace with the Mahrattas on the strength of what was understood to be a *cowle* from Bālāji Rao who had sent orders to the Mahratta general (Visāji Krishṇa) "to be friends with Hyder Naick, and act in conjunction with him."[44] Visāji Krishṇa, however, did not depart from Bangalore until he had obtained from Haidar formal cession of Krishṇagiri in Salem-Bārāmahal;[45] and the Mysoreans, disappointed, retraced their steps not long after.

His peace with them, November 1760.

41. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX, *Letter* No. 14 and VIII, *Letter* No. 380 *supra*; also VIII. pp. 308, 349: *Letter* Nos. 359 and 413, received September 18 and October 24, 1760; *Mily. Cons.*, 861: *Letter* dated September 23, 1760—Pigot and Council to Colonel Eyre Coote; 912-913, 933-934 (*Letters* dated October 8 and 12, 1760), etc.

42. *Ibid*, VIII. pp. 357-359, *Letter* dated November 13, 1760—Khaṇḍē Rao to Rāma Rao and Bakshi Krishṇaiya, Officers Commanding Mysore forces at Diṇḍigal. The letter refers to the place of Mokhdum's encampment as "Telamangolom," which is clearly Nelamangala according to the context.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 1127-1123 (*Letter* dated December 6, 1760—*Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council*); also XIV. 15-19 (*Letter* dated December 30, 1760—*Ibid*), and XIII. 1126, 1145 and 1162 (*Letters* dated December 11, 20 and 24, 1760). According to these *Cons.*, Visāji-Pant, after finishing the affairs at Bangalore, had arrived with the Mahratta army at the Cudapanāttam Pass by December 11, 1760. See also and compare *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. There was evidently a secret understanding of some kind underlying the above-mentioned peace, with a view to satisfy Haidar on the one hand and keep up the alleged Mahratta claims on the other. The opportunist that Haidar was, he was ever equal to all emergencies.

45. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. For a detailed account of this transaction, see *Neshaun. Hydur* (Col. Miles's translation), pp. 88-89. According to this work, Visāji Krishṇa was eventually disappointed by the deceptive orders issued by Haidar to the Faujdār of Krishṇagiri, and marched off without attaining his object.

Renews his southern movements, December 1760.

On the retirement of the Mahrattas and the Mysoreans, Saiyid Mokhdum with his forces entered Bangalore.[46] Early in December, Haidar, relieved from the fear of Mahratta attack, placed the fort under Ibrāhim Sāhib.[47] Then, out of an available strength of 3,000 horse and 6,000 *bār* and 4,000 Karnāṭak foot, he posted a portion under Mīr Alī Razā Khān for the conquest of the upper country and despatched another for the reduction of Satyamangalam and other taluks below the ghāṭs,[48] while he himself proceeded at the head of a small detachment towards the Gejjalahaṭṭi Pass, where he encamped about the middle of December.[49] For, with part of his forces united with the Mahrattas, it was his avowed object to march immediately to the assistance of his Pondicherry friends (*i.e.*, the French, now hard pressed by the English who had laid siege to Pondicherry), and eventually lead a joint attack against all his opponents in Mysore.[50]

Khaṇḍē Rao opposes him, December 1760.

Haidar's plans, however, were soon upset. For, already about this time, Khaṇḍē Rao, deceived in his expectations of the Mahratta alliance and alarmed by intelligence of Haidar's southern movements, had marched on with his forces towards Nanjangūḍ-Haradanahaḷḷi. About the 18th of December, he succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on Haidar at the Gejjalahaṭṭi Pass and putting his troops to flight.[51]

Haidar and Nanjarājaiya *vs.* Khaṇḍē Rao: December 1760.

For the time being, the Royalist cause, led by Khaṇḍē Rao, seemed to gain ground. Alone and helpless, Haidar's attention now became increasingly concentrated on the reduction of his domestic enemy (*i.e.*, Khaṇḍē Rao). His only hope of success in this

46. *Ibid.* 47. *Ibid.* 48. *Ibid.* 49. *Ibid.*

50. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 1127-1133, 642-645 *supra.*

51. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.; also *Mily. Cons.*, XIV. 15-19 *supra.* The *Haid. Nām.* somewhat loosely places this event early in January 1761 (*Vikrama*,

direction, however, appeared to lie in a timely composing of his differences with Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya, his erstwhile master, whose downfall he had lately assisted in bringing about. Accordingly he made haste to Koṇanūr where he stood as a supplicant before Nanjarājaiya, profuse as ever in his expressions of apology and penitence for his past conduct, and entreating, on solemn oath, to be restored to his (Nanjarājaiya's) favour.[52] Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao and other intimate councillors of Nanjarājaiya, we are told,[53] in close confidence, tried their utmost to dissuade the latter from the proposed accommodation and prevailed upon him to keep Haidar in close custody, but in vain. For, indeed, to Nanjarājaiya the presence of Haidar at this moment seemed most opportune, having by no means been satisfied with his own position since his loss of office in 1759 and having, already about October 1760, sought the aid of the English at Madras to re-establish himself in Seringapatam.[54] Believing, therefore, in the sincerity of Haidar's intentions, Nanjarājaiya readily condescended to overlook his faults,[55] and not only honoured him with presents but, placing his own troops at his (Haidar's) disposal, prepared to march with him, sending written instructions to the local parts to provide necessary supplies and assistance to Haidar.[56] At this change in the aspect of affairs, continues the chronicle,[57] Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao retired to Seringapatam in an attitude of positive disgust. About the end of December, Haidar, in alliance with Nanjarājaiya, had almost recovered his lost ground and was pressing Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar for the surrender of Khaṇḍē Rao to him. "Both Nunda

Pushya). Both with reference to the context and the *Mily. Cons.*, it seems to have taken place even much earlier, *i.e.*, about December 18 1760 (*Vikrama, Mārgaśira*).

52. *Ibid*, ff. 22-23. 53. *Ibid*, ff. 23.

54. *Press List* (1760), p. 212: *Letter* No. 1061, dated October 14, 1760—Muhammad Yusuf Khān to Pigot.

55. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. 56. *Ibid.* 57. *Ibid.*

Rauze [Nanjarājaiya] and Hyder Naick," says a letter,[58] "have united their Interests in order to oblige the King [*i.e.*, Krishṇarāja] to sacrifice Cundy Row [Khaṇḍē Rao] to their Resentment; Letters have past with offers from them of laying down their arms, if the King would deliver up the Prime Minister [*i.e.*, Khaṇḍē Rao], which he has resolutely refused and invested [him] with full power."

In January (1761) Haidar advanced as far as Kaṭṭe-Maḷaḷavāḍi,[59] threatening Seringapatam with a blockade, "if the King will not deliver up Candy Row [Khaṇḍē Rao]."[60] Thereupon Khaṇḍē Rao, accompanied by his colleagues, marched with his forces from the capital.[61] In the meantime, Haidar had contrived to get false letters—in his own name and that of Nanjarājaiya—written to the effect that all the principal officers in Seringapatam had been won over by him, that they were engaged in capturing Khaṇḍē Rao and been solemnly promised substantial rewards after they had actually delivered Khaṇḍē Rao to him. Haidar had also taken care to see that these letters fell into the hands of the sentinels of Khaṇḍē Rao's army.[62] The letters, as was expected, were promptly handed over by them to Khaṇḍē Rao, and he, on perusing them, so thoroughly believed in the reality of their contents that, apprehending treachery, he forthwith rode back in post haste to Seringapatam.[63] On receipt of this news, Haidar surprised and put to rout Khaṇḍē Rao's troops, capturing ammunitions and stores from his camp.[64] In February,

January-March 1761.

58. *Mily. Cons.*, XIV. 15-19 *supra*. 59. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c.

60. *Mily. Cons.*, 102-106: *Letter* dated January 17, 1761—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council.

61. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. 62. *Ibid.* 63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.* According to a *Despatch*, dated February 4, 1761, "Hyder Naig, former Duan to the King of Mysore but who lately rebelled, having made peace with the Morattas, has, we hear, collected a powerful army to oppose the King's forces. He will probably be joined by the party of French, that during the siege of Pondicherry was employed under the command of Major Allen, to endeavour to preserve its communication with

Haidar, having stationed Nanjarājaiya near Kaṭṭe-Maḷalavāḍi, proceeded up to Seringapatam.[65] On March 4 (*Vikrama, Māgha ba.* 13), he plundered Khaṇḍē Rao's detachment near the Bridge Gate and marched back towards the Gejjalahaṭṭi Pass.[66]

Haidar strengthens himself, March-May 1761.

During March-May, Haidar was active below the ghāṭs, taking possession of Satyamangalam, Kāvēripuram, Nāmakal, Anantagiri, Śankhagiri and other forts[67] and strengthening his position by winning the goodwill of the local populace, by amassing large sums of money, by increasing the numerical strength of his forces and by systematically corrupting the leading officials in Seringapatam through his agents.[68] Towards the close of May, Haidar retraced his steps to Mysore, after reducing all the military outposts of Seringapatam "with the help of his 5,000 horse, 8,000 muskets and 40 guns, well-equipped in all particulars."[69]

And invests Seringapatam, June 1761.

Early in June, Haidar arrived in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam and invested the fort about the middle of the month.[70] During the progress of the blockade

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the country, but the party we had out under Major Preston has always kept him in check" [*Mily. Desp. to Court*, III. 1-12; also *Mad. Desp.* (1754-1765), p. 231]. This document, while it but touches on the fringe of the internal politics of Mysore, merely points to how Haidar's strategic position in South India was being viewed by his foreign observers about January-February 1761. The course of affairs at home during the period was actually drifting in the manner described above.

65. *Ibid.* 66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid*; also *Mily. Cons.*, 299-300: *Letter* dated May 11, 1761—Major Preston, Trichinopoly, to Pigot and Council.

68. *Ibid*, ff. 23-24.

69. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 281, dated June 10, 1761—Mukund Rao Śrīpat, Hoskōṭe, to Pēshwa.

70. According to the above document, by June 10, 1761, "Pattan [Seringapatam] is still free, being commanded by the Kartar and Khande Rao Banaji. But Haidar is after it and wants to corrupt the inmates during his stay in the vicinity." Allowing an interval of a few days for these indirect efforts of Haidar, we would not be far wrong in fixing his investment of Seringapatam between the 13th and 20th of June 1761. For, as we shall see below, his ultimatum was acceded to on the 20th.

(*c.* June 13-20), he dictated the following terms to the Court of Seringapatam:[71] firstly, that Khaṇḍē Rao was to be surrendered to him (he having been, as Haidar alleged, a servant of his and not of the king); and secondly, that he (Haidar) was to be reimbursed the vast sums of money the Government owed him on account of the pay of the military and other items. If these terms were satisfied, Haidar added, he would leave Mysore forthwith and seek service elsewhere; otherwise he was prepared to continue the fight. The crisis had been reached. Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar found himself helpless in the extreme, he and his party having been foiled in their attempts to put down Haidar by the latter's superior cunning and power of dissimulation.

His ultimatum.

Since July-August 1760, it may be recalled, there was a movement afoot in Seringapatam, which systematically aimed at the destruction of Haidar and the preservation of the ancient Hindu sovereignty in Mysore. This movement, actively encouraged by Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, was led by Khaṇḍē Rao, who, though alleged to be a "servant" of his own by Haidar, was really a loyal subject and officer of the Rāja.[72] During September-November, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, as related already, was allied with the Mahrattas in blockading Haidar at Bangalore and in preventing him from being joined by

The Royalist movement, 1760-1761.

Their alliance with the Mahrattas (down to November 1760).

71. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 24.

72. Khaṇḍē Rao was a Mahratta (Dēśastha) Brāhman and belonged to the Banāji family. His full name was Khaṇḍē Rao Banāji, by which name he is mentioned and referred to in the Pēshwa's correspondence of the period. (See, for instance, f.n. 70 *supra*). The Banāji family is still represented in the Mysore State. Some of its members have since the Restoration held subordinate offices in the State Government or in the office of the Hon'ble the British Resident in Mysore. There were other members of the Banāji family serving in Mysore contemporaneously with Khaṇḍē Rao and even before his time. (See, for instance, *ante* Chs. IX. 190, and X. 209, f.n. 16; 213, f.n. 30; 217, f.n. 59, etc., referring

Saiyid Mokhdum's detachment from Pondicherry. In furtherance of this objective, Krishṇarāja, early in September, seemed desirous of accommodating affairs with the English also at Madras.[73] The latter at first appeared to view this proposal with disfavour, as they held:[74] "Although Hyder Naig be in rebellion to the King as well as an enemy to us, we are by no means satisfied that the King is not also opposed to our interest . . ." Evidently, in the absence of correct information, they took him, and no less Haidar, to be in alliance with the French, since, about this time, the Mysore troops under Saiyid Mokhdum were ravaging the Company's territories. About the end of September, however, Krishṇarāja Wodeyar, by way of renewing his friendship with the English, wrote to Captain Richard Smith (commanding at Karūr),[75] assuring him that Haidar had joined the French without his orders, advising him of his having sent a Vakīl to the Governor of Madras, expressing his intention—as soon as certain affairs were settled—of sending "5,000 horse, 6,000 or 7,000 seapoys [sepoys] and a good many cannon with plenty of ammunition, together with 4,000 or 5,000 Morattas" under Khaṇḍē Rao to the assistance of the English against Pondicherry,

And their negotiations with the English Government at Madras, September-October 1760.

to Banāji Mādhava Rao or Banāji-Pant, the Pēshwa's representative at the Court of Seringapatam during 1755-1758). The sole justification—if such a word can at all be used in such a connection—for Haidar's claiming him as his "servant" was that he had worked with Haidar and Haidar had risen in the service of the king sooner than Khaṇḍē Rao and had sought sometimes to assert his new superiority over his old friend and colleague in service.

73. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 816-823: *Letter* dated September 6, 1760—Captain Richard Smith, Karūr, to George Pigot and Council, Fort St. George; see also *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. p. 352: *Letter* No. 420, received October 26, 1760—Nawāb (Muhammad Alī Wālājāh) to Pigot.

74. *Ibid*, 832-834: *Letter* dated September 15, 1760—Pigot and Council to Capt. Smith.

75. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 321: *Letter* No. 380, received October 3, 1760—King of Mysore to Capt. Smith.

and seeking their aid to beat Haidar's troops under Mokhdum, then on their way to Bangalore. About the same time Khaṇḍē Rao also wrote a similar letter to George Pigot, Governor of Madras,[76] requesting him to order the cessation of disturbances by the Company's troops within the limits of Karūr belonging to Mysore.

The negotiations continued, October-December, 1760.

During October-November, the English Government at Madras seemed to entertain great hopes of the conclusion of an alliance with the king of Mysore as an advisable measure, in view of their renewed struggle with the French at Pondicherry.[77] They not only despatched a detachment under Major Preston to prevent the French at Tyāga-durg from joining Haidar,[78] but also ordered the Company's officers to desist from any further hostilities in the Mysore country,[79] and were in expectation of the arrival of the Mysore Vakīl at Madras,[80] even pressing the king and Khaṇḍē Rao on the subject.[81] So anxious indeed were they about the proposed alliance that, on December 18, they recorded a

76. *Ibid*, pp. 328-330, *Letter* No. 387, received October 7, 1760—Khaṇḍē Rao to Pigot; see also p. 321: *Letter* No. 379, received October 3, 1760—Khaṇḍē Rao to Capt. Smith. In keeping with these documents, a *Despatch* reports thus on the affairs of Mysore: "The King of Mysore, with the assistance of the Marathas, expelled his prime-minister and general Haidar Nayak. His new minister Khande Rao wrote to the President and the Nawab, stating that Haidar Nayak was a rebel who had joined the French on his own authority. This revolution caused Matta Nayak [Mokhdum Nāyak], the commander of Haidar's party, to return to Mysore and engage the Marathas, thus freeing us from the fear of a Maratha incursion. . . . A Vakil is expected from the King of Mysore" (*Mad. Desp.*, p. 227: *Despatch* dated November 3, 1760—Pigot and Council to the Company).

77. *Ibid*, pp. 326-327: *Letter* No. 384, dated October 6, 1760—Pigot to Nawāb; also *Mily. Cons.*, 908-910: *Consultation* dated October 6, 1760.

78. *Ibid*, pp. 324-325: *Letter* No. 383, dated October 6, 1760—Pigot to King of Mysore.

79. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 384 *supra*; also p. 327: *Letter* dated October 6, 1760—Pigot to Muhammad Yusuf Khān; and pp. 347-348: *Letter* No. 409, dated October 22, 1760—Pigot to Khaṇḍē Rao.

80. *Mad. Desp.*: *Despatch* cited in f.n. 76 *supra*.

81. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 383 and 409 *supra*.

Minute to the following effect:[82] "The delay of the King of Mysore in sending his Vackeel to Madras and [in] replying to the several letters we have since wrote him, show[s] that his former proposal[s] to accommodate with us were only to amuse. But although we are convinced that neither the King nor Hyder Naigue wish our prosperity, it is yet possible they may from political motives be kept from joining the enemy [*i.e.*, the French], at least the King, who without great probability of success would hardly venture to assist our enemies openly and by that means draw upon him our resentment in case we succeed against Pondicherry. In our present circumstances, it is most certainly our interest to gain time and we much approve of Captain Smith's thought of opening a negotiation for that purpose, as the correspondence he has already had with Mysore may naturally lead to it and time may be protracted by waiting for our conclusion. It is thought necessary and agreed that Capt. Smith be invested with power to make such proposals either to the King of Mysore or Hyder Naigue, as from circumstances shall appear to him best calculated to serve our present purpose, without including any definitive treaty which is always to be referred to our approval and determination." At the same consultation, they also resolved to continue the management of Karūr and other districts (belonging to Mysore) under an Amildār, with a view to their eventual restoration to Mysore,[83] for they held:[84] "If the King of Mysore is to be wrought upon by negotiation to refrain from giving assistance to our enemies, the hopes

82. *Mily. Cons.*, 1132-1133: *Consultation* dated December 18, 1760; also 1140-1141: *Letter* dated December 20, 1760—Pigot and Council to Capt. Smith. According to *Mily. Cons.*, 1116-1117 (*Letter* dated December 6, 1760), a Vakīl from the king of Mysore had arrived in the English army about December 6, and was expected at Madras. The Vakīl, however, as we shall see in the sequel, appeared before George Pigot at Pondicherry only about the middle of January 1761.

83. *Ibid.* 84. *Ibid.*

of having the Caroor districts restored may be a consideration of weight . . ." In the meanwhile, the Governor (Pigot) had also written to Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar,[85] expressing his surprise at the non-arrival of his (Rāja's) Vakīl to settle affairs, acquainting him with the low state to which the French had been reduced, desiring him to be on his guard against any promises for assistance the latter would doubtless make to be relieved from their distress, and expecting to be informed of his final intentions without delay.

December 1760–June 1761.

Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, during a greater part of the period (October-November 1760), found it expedient to temporise,[86] sanguine as he was about his alliance with the Mahrattas against Haidar. It was not, however, till about the end of December 1760 that the Royalists, deceived by the Mahrattas and alarmed by the combination of Haidar and Nanjarājaiya,[87] began to look upon the English as their "most natural ally,"[88] and were inclined more earnestly to seek their friendship.[89] In January 1761, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar and Khaṇḍē Rao communicated with the Governor of Madras, advising him of their having despatched to him their Vakīl Śrīnivāsāchāri,[90] Khaṇḍē Rao, in particular, assuring the

85. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, pp. 369-370: *Letter* No. 445, dated December 9, 1760—Pigot to King of Mysore.

86. *Mily. Cons.*, 1106: *Letter* dated November 26, 1760—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council; 1112-1114: *Letter* dated December 4, 1760—Pigot and Council to Col. Eyre Coote. According to *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* No. 379 *supra*, a headman of the Diṇḍigal province had been ordered to wait upon Capt. Smith (in September 1760) and a Vakīl from the king of Mysore was intended to be sent to him sometime later.

87. *Ibid*, XIV. 15-19 *supra*. 88. *Ibid*. 89. *Ibid*.

90. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX. pp. 11-12: *Letter* No. 14, received January 26, 1761; also pp. 12-13, *Letter* No. ?—Khaṇḍē Rao to Pigot. The date of writing or of receipt of the second letter is not recorded. But from the similarity of the contents, it appears to have been written and received about the same time as the first one, *i.e.*, January 1761. In the *Press List* for 1761, both these documents are entered as on January 15 (see p. 268, *Letter* Nos. 1339 and 1340).

Governor of his desire to join him "to do things of great consequence."[91] In February, Krishṇarāja again wrote to the Governor on the subject of his friendship with the English, reminding him of his having sent Śrīnivāsāchāri (the Vakīl) to inform him "of some certain matters."[92] During March-April, Krishṇaiya, Chief Bakshī of the Rāja, negotiated with Nawāb Muhammad Alī for securing through him English support against Haidar.[93] On April 30, the Bakshi addressed a letter to the Governor,[94] entreating him to assist and support his master's Government by all means by ordering the despatch of the English army "to punish Hyder Naick and take possession of the Gadys [gāḍi] and countries." In May, Krishṇaiya waited upon the English at Trichinopoly in hopes of their "sending him assistance

91. *Ibid*, pp. 12-13 *supra*.

92. *Ibid*, p. 23: *Letter* No. 37, received February 15, 1761—King of Mysore to Pigot.

93. *Ibid*, pp. 55-56 : *Letter* No. 105, dated April 30, 1761—Bakshi Krishṇaiya to Pigot. The Bakshi is referred to in this and the other documents as "Banda Krishnaya," "Bein Kisthna," "Beni Kistnah," "Benny Kistnah," "Bany Krishnaya"—"the King's General," "the King of Mysore's chief Bexy," "a creditable person," etc. (see *Mily. Cons.*, XIV. 15-19, 102-106, 299-300; *Mily. Count. Corres.*, VIII. 357-359; IX. *Letter* No. 142, etc.). He appears to have been popularly known as Benne Krishṇaiya (?), the prefix being pronounced by his English contemporaries in the forms mentioned above. As early as December-January 1760-1761, Krishṇaiya—then commanding at Tottiyam, near Diṇḍigal—had moved with Capt. Richard Smith at Trichinopoly in the matter of a treaty of alliance with the English against Haidar, "which he expected every hour to be invested with full power to conclude" (*Mily. Cons.*, 102-106 *supra*). On the approach of Haidar towards Nāmakal in March 1761, the Bakshi, according to the letter under reference (*Mily. Count. Corres.*, No. 105 *supra*), was entrusted by his master (*i.e.*, the king of Mysore) with "the management of the districts and gadys [gaḍi] on this side of the Canama of the Mysore country," and some of the troops of Mysore placed under his command, in anticipation of English assistance to put down the growing power of Haidar. It was during his sojourn below the ghāṭs that he came into contact with Nawāb Muhammad Alī Wālājāh and the English Government at Fort St. George, Madras. Bakshi Krishṇaiya was a staunch Royalist. The *gadys* (*gaḍis*) referred to are the fortified hills and rocks with which the country was then full.

94. *Ibid*.

enough to recover his master's affairs and overset Hyder Naig."[95] In or about June, the Bakshi concluded an agreement[96] with the Nawāb to the effect that if an army of 1,000 soldiers, 3,000 sepoys, 200 troopers and 1,000 horse with 20 guns and mortars were sent to the assistance of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar, he would pay the charges thereof (rupees ten lakhs, at one lakh a month) monthy, provided Katti Gōpālarāja Urs (who was in confinement in the Trichinopoly fort since July 1752) was released. About the same time, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar and Karāchūri Nanjarājaiya (the latter having by now transferred his allegiance to the Rāja, having been lately deceived by Haidar) sent to acquaint Muhammad Yusuf Khān (officer in charge of Madura and Tinnevelly on behalf of Nawāb Muhammad Alī),[97] "that Hyder Naick extended his animosity to the highest pitch and laid siege to Seringapatam alias Mysore, so that if the Company will be pleased to send an assistance of force and extirpate the enemy, in that case they (the King and Nanzeraz) will make them a present of two

95. *Mily. Cons.*, 299-300: Maj. Preston's letter dated May 11, 1761, cited in f.n. 67 *supra*.

96. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, pp. 83-84: *Letter* No. 142, dated June 30, 1761—Nawāb to Pigot. For the text of the agreement contained in this letter, *vide* Appendix II—(9). Though the letter is dated June 30, the agreement referred to in it seems to have been, according to the context, concluded much earlier, as stated above. Katti Gōpālarāja Urs, mentioned in the document, was not released from Trichinopoly till 1762. And in March of that year, he was appointed by Haidar to the charge of Chikballāpur (see *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 25 A).

97. *Ibid*, pp. 191-192: *Letter* No. 159, dated July 29, 1761—Muhammad Yusuf Khān to Pigot. The proposals related in this letter appear to have been made, according to the context, much earlier than the date of the letter itself, *i.e.*, in or about June 1761. As to Muhammad Yusuf Khān, see W. Francis, I.C.S., in *Madura District Gazetteer*, 62-67, and the authorities cited therein; also the monograph entitled *Yusuf Khan, the Rebel Commandant*, by S. C. Hill, I.E.S. (Retd.), 1914. Sir John Malcolm spoke of Yusuf Khān as "the bravest and ablest of all the native soldiers that ever served the English in India." Col. Fullarton writing of him says that his example shows that "wisdom, vigour and integrity are of no climate or complexion." See *A View of English Interests in India* (Madras Edn., 1867). Yusuf Khān proved a rebel and was hanged in 1764.

lacks of Pagodas and bear the expense of the troops besides, . . . that as long as the Company remain [in] the Carneteck [Karnāṭak] country they should assist them and they would give up to the Company the districts of Dindigal, etc., in the Pain Gaut [Pāyanghāṭ] but that if the Company are not desirous of these districts, in such case they will deliver up countries to the amount of 4 or 5 lakhs towards Tellichery as their limits lie near the said place and further that they will not sell the merchandizes of their country such as cloth, sandallwood, etc., to any except the Company whom they will always supply and are desirous that the friendship with the Company should be continued from generation to generation."

The English attitude on the Mysore question, 1760-1761.

The attitude of the English Government at Madras on the Mysore question during the period was, however, in close keeping with their policy towards the French, being, as usual, governed rather by considerations of expediency than political insight. During December-January (1760-1761), Pondicherry was closely besieged by the English and they directed all their resources to the crushing of the French power in India. Early in December, the English seemed to view with concern the possibility of the French being joined by Haidar and the Mahrattas.[98] Their apprehension was, however, soon removed by the rise of the combination of Haidar and Nanjarājaiya against the Royalists in Seringapatam. So that, at the end of December, the English seemed inclined to support the king against Haidar and to amuse the latter,[99] and in January, it was very much in their own interest to settle matters with the king of Mysore, cultivate more assiduously an alliance with him

98. *Mily. Cons.*, XIII. 1127-1133, cited in f.n. 44 *supra*.
9. *Ibid*, XIV. 15-19 (cited in f.n. 44 *supra*) and 25-26 (*Letter* dated January 9, 1761)—Council to Capt. Smith.

and "prevent an union betwixt the king and Hyder Naig."[100] About the middle of January, the Mysore Vakīl arrived in Pondicherry but was ordered by the Governor of Madras to wait upon Muhammad Alī.[101] The latter took him to Trichinopoly, promising that he would dispatch the king's affairs.[102] On the 16th, Pondicherry was reduced by the English and in February, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar and Bakshi Krishṇaiya were desired to send their Vakīls to Madras if they had any proposals to make.[103] However much the English wished to conduct "further negotiations with the Court of Mysore,"[104] they seemed to be less earnest about it, despite the Nawāb's advices to settle the Mysore affairs,[105] and Major Preston's letter from Trichinopoly, urging for the Governor's particular instructions in the matter of sending assistance to Mysore.[106] In reply to the Major's letter, however, the Government only recorded a *Minute*, acquainting him[107] "that as we hold it necessary at present to preserve tranquillity in the country, he is on no account to furnish the Nabob or

100. *Ibid*, 28-35: *Consultation* dated January 12, 1761; 102-106: *Letter* dated January 17, 1761, *cited* in f.n. 60 *supra*. According to the latter document, about January 17, 1761, there seemed every possibility of success for the Royalists against Haidar, if they could only be effectively supported by the English. For the forces of the king of Mysore had by now assembled near the English frontiers at Diṇḍigal, Salem and Nāmakal, "all which could join in two days, if necessary, [*i.e.*,] about 2,500 horse and 3,000 seapoys [sepoys], besides matchlocks, etc., innumerable." The English, however, about this time, were actively engaged in the reduction of Pondicherry.

101. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, *Letter* Nos. 37 and 105 *supra*.

102. *Ibid*, *Letter* No. 105 *supra*.

103. *Mily. Cons.*, 189 (*Letter* dated February 19, 1761—Capt. Smith to Pigot and Council); see also 146 (*Letter* dated February 10, 1761—Pigot and Council to Capt. Smith) and 102-106 (*Minutes of Cons.*, dated January 27, 1761?).

104. *Ibid*, 102-106: *Minutes of Cons.*, cited *supra*.

105. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 38, *Letter* No. 70, dated March 25, 1761—Nawāb to Pigot; and pp. 83-84, *Letter* No. 142 (dated June 30, 1761), cited in f.n. 96 *supra*.

106. *Mily. Cons.*, 299-300 (*Letter* dated May 11, 1761—Maj. Preston to Pigot and Council), cited in f.n. 67 *supra*.

107. *Ibid*: *Minutes of Cons.*

any country powers with troops from his garrison without our express orders, but to apprise the Nabob that his application must be immediately [sent] to us for any assistance he may stand in need of." The proposals for an accommodation with Mysore lingered on and were finally rejected by the Government (in July).[108]

The position of the Mahrattas in the Karnāṭak (down to June 1761).

Elsewhere, too, the state of affairs was thoroughly unfavourable to the Royalist cause in Mysore. On the 14th of January 1761, the Mahrattas had sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of Ahmad Shah Ābdāli on the field of Pāṇipat (the last battle of Pāṇipat). Stunned by the news of that disaster, Visāji Krishṇa, who had encamped in the Pāyanghāṭ since December 1760, hastened back to his country about April.[109] His departure meant, indeed, a serious blow to the progress of Mahratta arms in the Karnāṭak and

108. *Ibid*, XV. 451-452: Council's *Proceedings*, dated July 15, 1761, on *Mily. Count. Corres.*, IX, *Letter* Nos. 140 and 142 (*supra*), from Nizām Alī and the Nawāb, received at *Fort St. George* on July 14 and 15 respectively. According to No. 140, Nizām Alī had sought the aid of the English E. I. Company to establish himself in Hyderabad by overthrowing Salābat Jang. The Council, however, observed: "Though Nizam Ally's offers have the appearance of great advantage to the Company, yet the recent proofs of the loss which the French Company sustained by their troops in the Deccan notwithstanding the immense revenues assigned for their support is a warning to us not to plunge the Company into the same difficulties by sending their troops into parts so distant from their capital at this time, especially when the country is scarcely sound and indeed it would not at any time be advisable to undertake an expedition into the Deccan without a sum of money amply sufficient to defray all the charges until the revenues of the country assigned should put into our hands such a capital as might enable us to ensure to the Company a profit at least equal to the expense." On the Nawāb's letter (No. 142), they recorded: "The same reasons induce us to reject the proposals of the King of Mysore without first having money in hand." At the same time, the Council unanimously held "that as the war with the French, though they have been subdued on the coast, still subsists, our affairs are not yet in a sufficient state of security to admit of our sending an army to Nizam Ally's assistance," while "apparently no reply was resolved to be sent to either [the] Nabob, or [the] Mysore King, or his representative, Beny Krishnaya [Bakshi Krishṇaiya]."

109. *Mily. Count. Corres.*, p. 41: *Letter* No. 76, received April 1, 1761.

South India. They were in danger of losing one by one most of their outposts in the Bālaghāṭ.[110] Already about June, Mirza Kabīr Beig, Haidar's lieutenant from Bangalore—commanding 600 horse, 500 gunners, 3 guns and 2,000 Karnāṭak foot-soldiers—had succeeded in taking Nelamangala, Dēvanahaḷḷi and other stations.[111] The Mahratta position in the Karnāṭak in June is, perhaps, best reflected in a letter of Mukund Rao Śrīpat, from Hoskōṭe, wherein he reports to the Pēshwa thus:[112] "Ever since Visaji Krishna left this part and approached the Tungabhadra, the Palegars on this side have begun circulating all kinds of false alarms and acting in all sorts of unrestricted and uncontrolled manner in even places belonging to our Government. . . . It is known to all that Haidar bears an ill-will against me, from long ago. Therefore he is on the lookout for an opportunity to play false against me just when I came in his grip after leaving Hoskota . . . Cuddapah, Jagadev [Mysore], Vajrakarur, all these stations are very insistent in their demands for help. Their needs are certainly urgent. However much I may long for helping them, the position here is quite disappointing and if I cannot help them, the stations can scarcely be held . . . The arrangements made by Visaji Krishna as regards the appointment of the garrison and other matters are so scanty and scandalous that the less said about them the better. The only way, therefore, to save the situation and protect the Mamlatdars here is to despatch some forces speedily from the capital. I will not fail to make every effort in my power, as I value government service better than my very life. And I have determined to give my very life while on duty.

110. *Sel. Pesh. Daft.*, Vol. XXVIII, *Letter* No. 281 (dated June 10, 1761), cited in f.n. 69 *supra*.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.* For a connected account of the Mahrattas in Mysore, *vide* Appendix II—(10).

It is daily growing difficult to recruit new men as all capable persons have already been taken up by Haidar Naik. Kanarese soldiers, which are the only kind available, are not to be depended upon in this crisis. And I see no other remedy to quiet all the elements of disloyalty but by the arrival of the Government forces. It can be imagined how the revenues cannot be collected under these circumstances . . . Kabir Beig from Bangalore, the man of Haidar, is waiting just two *kosh* from here to entangle me and is using all his ingenuity in devising a new cause for struggle everyday. We have no other course but to take things lying down and restrain us from hastily involving ourselves in a ruinous quarrel. If I once leave the fort [of Hoskōṭe] and go away 5/7 *kosh*, I cannot be sure of returning to it very easily. The whole situation seems like carrying fire in the sleeves, and yet I cannot but think that only a thousand horsemen could have brought the situation under control. With that much power behind me I would have risked going anywhere to Gurrumkonda, Sarkar Jagadevgad [Mysore] and Vajrakarur, the rightful possessions of Government. What could have Ajij Khan [Azīz Khān][113] been able to do if I had ventured to relieve any one or even all of these stations which are pitiably helpless? It is better to close one's eyes in death rather than be compelled to tamely brook the insulting attitude of these paltry enemies. We are ashamed to see the plight of our master. The Sardars come to this part very often, invested with the full responsibility of administering the conquests here. It is incumbent upon them to appoint competent men and to provide them with sufficiently powerful garrisons, with foresight and real understanding as to the imminent problems of the situation. Their negligence inevitably

113. Azīz Khān, according to the context, was formerly in Haidar's service, which he had lately left.

makes the Government interests to suffer and their prestige to lower down, besides making the situation particularly dangerous for those who are to stay here for long. The Palegars here have their own uncanny ways of circulating all sorts of rumours regarding the difficulties the Mahrattas had to encounter in the north and they have begun to regularly flout our authority. We are but servants and will not fail in our duty so long as we are alive. We shall be faithful and remain loyal for ever. If only 5,000 men are sent in this nick of time, the Mahratta power will be maintained in this province . . ." In these circumstances, any hope of succour from the Mahrattas against Haidar was well nigh an impossibility.

The climax, June 20, 1761.

In this extremity, Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar and the dowager queen were prevailed upon by the councillors—by now won over by Haidar—to accede to Haidar's terms as the only way out of the difficulty.[114] Accordingly, on June 20 (*Vishu, Jyēṣṭha ba.* 3), Khaṇḍē Rao was surrendered to Haidar[115] (who kept him a close prisoner)[116] and the latter, with the help of Pradhān Venkaṭapataiya, concluded an arrangement, assigning a three lakh territory to Krishṇarāja and one lakh country to Karāchūri Nanjatājaiya, and reserved for himself the management of the rest of the kingdom ostensibly to meet the expenses of the army and the annual contribu-

114. *Haid. Nām.*, ff. 24. 115. *Ibid.*

116. *Mily. Cons.*, XV. 531: *Letter* dated August 31, 1761—Maj. Preston to Pigot and Council. For what was his alleged ingratitude to Haidar, Khaṇḍē Rao was, according to the generally accepted local accounts, condemned (by Haidar) to life-long punishment by being put in an iron cage and fed on rice and milk like a parrot, and exposed in the market-place at Bangalore—a most pathetic end. Whatever may be the nature or extent of Haidar's allegations against him, Khaṇḍē Rao, from the materials now available, will ever be remembered as a loyal subject of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar II, who, as the leader of the Royalist movement, worked wholeheartedly to save the country from the usurper's hands.

tions to the Nizām and the Mahrattas.[117] At the same time, Venkaṭapataiya was granted Kuṇigal as a rent-free estate (*inām*) and the other councillors promised suitable awards.[118] Then Haidar took formal possession of the fort of Seringapatam, and on July 3 (*Vishu, Āshāḍha śu.* 1) appointed Saiyid Mokhdum as its killēdār.[119] He next attended to the preliminary arrangements for the defence of the fort and placed Bokkasada Venkaṭapataiya in charge of the administration of the *Kartar's* portion of the kingdom (*Kartara-sīme kārubāru*).[120] Haidar's usurpation was practically complete by about the middle of July, when he left with his family for Bangalore.[121] Thus, by a combination of circumstances at once favourable to himself and detrimental to the Royalists, Haidar stepped into the position of the Daḷavāis, eclipsing them as the supreme arbiter of the destiny of the kingdom of Mysore.

Haidar's usurpation complete, July 1761.

Inscriptions of Krishṇarāja Woḍeyar extend up to 1766.[122] Evidently, he continued to rule though with his authority considerably reduced. He kept up making grants, etc., during the remainder of his reign, 1761-1766. His political position in this period, perhaps, finds adequate expression in a letter which speaks of him thus:[123] "The King still bears the outward show of what he was, but no more. Hyder Naig has

Eighth Phase: 1761-1766.

The usurpation and after.

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117. *Haid. Nām.*, l.c. The *Annals* (I. 194-196) tacitly assumes the usurpation and speaks of it in terms of delegation of powers by the king to Haidar, treating the latter as a *Sarvādhikāri*. The truth was, however, as related above, that Haidar himself, by his usurpation, virtually stepped into the position of the *Sarvādhikāri*, maintaining intact the *de jure* sovereignty of Krishṇarāja, very much like the Daḷavāis. The question of sovereignty during the usurpation period is dealt with separately below.

118. *Ibid.*

119. *Ibid.*

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid.*

122. Noticed below in another chapter.

123. *Mily. Cons.*, l.c.

entirely divested him of the management of his country." In keeping with this description are certain records in which Nawāb Haidar Alī Khān is formally treated or referred to as agent to the reigning king (*Kārya-karta*).[124]

With this we enter upon a new phase in the reign of Krishṇarāja, to which we shall advert presently.

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124. *Vide* references noticed under *Grants and other Records* in a subsequent Chapter below.